C oncerns about terrorists smuggling nuclear bombs into the United States in container freight have led to demands for 100% inspection at either U.S. or foreign ports. However, under some circumstances, it may be possible to deter nuclear smuggling attempts with less than 100% inspection. Based on publicly available data, we quantify a game-theoretic model of terrorist decision making to understand the role of nuclear detection technologies in deterring nuclear terrorism. The results suggest that unless the defender imposes high retaliation costs on the attacker, 100% inspection is likely to be needed, and deterrence with partial inspection may not be achievable in practice even though it is possible in theory. On the other hand, when the defender can credibly threaten the attacker with costly retaliation, partial inspection may be sufficient to deter nuclear smuggling attempts. Sensitivity analysis of these results indicates that these observations are robust to assumptions about specific parameters in the model. Thus, for policy debates about how to prevent nuclear terrorism, consideration of the diplomatic stance on retaliation is as important as, or maybe even more important than, debate about the optimal percentage of containers to inspect.
Introduction
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has been concerned about protecting the country against terrorism. One major concern is the smuggling of nuclear weapons into the United States through container freight. This creates question about how security can be used to prevent a successful nuclear attack against the United States by terrorists.
Debates about security against the threat of nuclear terrorism cover questions about how effective inspection technologies can be (Cochran and McKinzie 2008) , whether security can deter or dissuade a terrorist group from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons or attack using them (Jenkins 2008) , and whether 100% container inspection is effective or even necessary (Martonosi et al. 2005 , Wein et al. 2006 .
Since 2002, the availability of inspection equipment for detecting radioactive materials at ports has increased dramatically. The current technology, polyvinyl toluene (PVT) portal monitors, is designed as a passive, nonintrusive method for screening containers. However, PVT scanners have only limited ability to differentiate between radioactive materials. Recently, the United States has considered enhancing the nuclear detection system used to inspect shipping containers by installing advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs) based on sodium iodide detection capabilities. These detectors can discriminate between different types of radiation sources, and thus could improve how inspection operations handle innocuous radiation sources (such as certain ceramics) that are commonly encountered in commerce.
Currently, seven overseas ports scan 100% of U.S.-bound maritime cargo, according to the Secure Freight Initiative (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2007) . These seven ports use nonintrusive and 89 passive radiation-detection equipment to detect illicit nuclear and radiological materials. In addition, ASP is being deployed as a secondary inspection technology at foreign port locations including Southampton in the United Kingdom, Antwerp in Belgium, Colombo in Sri Lanka, Manila in the Philippines, and Hong Kong. This new technology is being investigated further for its costs and benefits before being deployed at U.S. ports.
However, evaluations of these and similar programs call into question the cost effectiveness of container security measures. The capital and operating costs associated with nuclear detectors demand consideration of the benefits afforded by new detection technologies. However, it is difficult to assess their security benefits because of deep uncertainty about where and when terrorists might attempt to smuggle a nuclear device through ports, and also about how terrorists might adapt or respond to improvements in nuclear detection systems. Thus, cost-benefit analysis of nuclear detection systems must consider the increased detection capability that systems afford, how the anticipated benefits of this capability would change as threat levels increase, and the role that nuclear detection plays in deterring terrorist use of nuclear weapons (National Academies 2009 , GAO 2009a .
The benefits from border-security efforts, like container inspection, are derived from the performance of at least two security functions: detecting attacks and deterring would-be attackers from attempting attacks, where deterrence can include influencing an attacker either not to attack or to attack in a different way (Willis et al. 2010) . Thus, when designing detection systems to perform these functions, policy makers set goals for the effectiveness of detection technologies being developed and decide what proportion of containers to inspect.
Past research by Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) has shown that it may be possible to deter smuggling attempts with less than 100% inspection. In particular, they provide a game-theoretic model to analytically determine conditions under which partial inspection will be sufficient to deter smuggling attempts. They assume multiple attackers, each attempting to smuggle in a different type of weapon (e.g., dirty bombs versus nuclear bombs).
Many other studies have also focused on preventing smuggling of nuclear weapons, nuclear material, or other weapons of mass destruction in container freight. For example, Willis and Ortiz (2004) apply risk assessment to the global containerized supply chain and identify gaps where additional security is needed. Boros et al. (2009) apply a large-scale linear program to decide whether containers from cargo ships coming into the United States should be opened; this work has been extended by Boros et al. (2010) , who use integer programming and dynamic programming to identify optimal sequential inspection policies for incoming containers. Zhang et al. (2006) study the problem of container inspection at ports of entry by determining the optimum thresholds for sensors at inspection stations to minimize the overall cost of inspection. Elsayed et al. (2009) likewise use optimization to determine the optimal sensor threshold levels, given constraints regarding the maximum acceptable level of errors, the budget, and the total cost of inspection. Bakır (2008) studies costs and benefits from applying countermeasures at U.S. southwestern land ports of entry to reduce the success probability of terrorist attacks via commercial trucks. Barrett (2010) studies the cost effectiveness of generating chlorine at all U.S. facilities that receive chlorine by truck to protect against chlorine truck attacks. Bakshi et al. (2011) use simulation to investigate the impact of various inspection policies at two large international ports; in particular, they claim that the use of high-capacity drive-through equipment would make 100% inspection feasible. Wein et al. (2006) develop an optimal inspection strategy for detecting nuclear weapons being smuggled into the United States in shipping containers, subject to port congestion and budget constraints. Wang and Zhuang (2011) apply queuing theory and game theory to study the tradeoffs between congestion and security. Shattan (2008) compares the benefits of different radiation-detection systems using an analytic-deliberative process, involving expert judgment and decision analysis. Merrick and McLay (2010) consider the potential importance of deterrence by treating it as a parametric multiplier that changes the likelihood of attack. They also find that multiple levels of screening improve the probability of detecting nuclear weapons; however, they conclude that U.S. Customs and Border Protection should INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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Decision Analysis 8(2), pp. 88-102, © 2011 INFORMS screen only once if the level of deterrence from the first round of screening is sufficiently high because of the high cost of multilevel screening. In addition to research on container inspection, there has also been extensive research on inspection games, primarily in arms control. The first inspection game was introduced by Dresher (1962) ; in this game, the inspector can allocate a fixed number of inspections over a fixed number of stages, deciding whether it is optimal to inspect at a given stage, under the assumption of simultaneous moves between the inspector and the inspectee. Dresher's (1962) initial model has been extended by other researchers, with the main focus still on arms control and disarmament. Avenhaus et al. (1996) reviews applications of game theory to arms control as of the mid 1990s. Those applications assume an inspector who establishes some legal obligation and an inspectee who aims to violate that obligation. Early models generally assume that the inspector maximizes the probability of detection in a zero-sum game, whereas later models apply utility theory to the inspection game and consider variants such as non-zero-sum games, signaling games, and the possibility of bargaining in the context of arms control. Avenhaus et al. (1996) present a model that explores inspection of multiple classes of material. This model yields an optimal sample size for each class of material, again maximizing the probability of detection; however, the model does not consider the possibility of deterring the inspectee's illegal action. Kilgour and Brams (1992) compare simultaneous and sequential moves for a two-person inspection game, and Kilgour (1992) studies how to select which site to inspect. More recently, Avenhaus and Kilgour (2004) extended the inspection game to find the level of resources needed to deter all violations and also how to allocate limited resources among multiple inspectees to minimize expected damage. Avenhaus and Canty (2005) model inspection over multiple time periods, and Madigan et al. (2007) solve a binary decision tree to minimize the total cost of inspection. This paper extends the existing literature in three ways. First, we demonstrate practical applications of game theory to security policy by applying the model of Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) to focus specifically on deterring and detecting the smuggling of nuclear weapons. Doing this involved modifying the model of Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) to allow smuggling of multiple nuclear weapons by a single attacker, quantifying the model parameters based on limited publicly available data, and exploring the sensitivity of the results to plausible changes in parameter values and assumptions. Second, we extend past studies by Wein et al. (2006) , Martonosi et al. (2005) , and others by explicitly modeling deterrence as one of the potential benefits of detection technologies for countering nuclear terrorism. Finally, we extend the findings from Merrick and McLay (2010) , who also consider deterrence as a benefit of security by exploring in more detail the conditions under which deterrence can potentially be achieved.
The remainder of this paper describes the extended deterrence model used to analyze the problem of nuclear security ( §2), and describes insights from the model structure ( §3) and approximate parameter values that can be used to analyze policy choices for countering nuclear terrorism ( §4). This paper concludes with discussions of observations about nuclear deterrence and detection as well as limits and possible extensions of this analysis ( § §5 and 6). Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) show that a defender who announces and commits to an adequate level of partial inspection may sometimes be able to deter smuggling attempts by terrorists even without 100% inspection. In this paper, we extend and apply that model to identify the required percentage of containers that must be inspected to deter a terrorist from attempting a nuclear attack using container shipping.
Deterrence Model
Here, we consider inspection for presence of nuclear detonation devices such as uranium or plutonium bombs, or the radioactive materials used in these devices. As in Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) , we assume that all containers are identical to the defender (having the same likelihood of containing a nuclear bomb, the same probability that a bomb will be successfully detected if one is present, etc.) and that the inspection cost is the same for all containers, regardless of whether they contain a nuclear bomb. The model is agnostic as to where inspection occurs. Thus, the conclusions are applicable to consideration of programs that are intended to inspect containers at U.S. ports (like the ASP program of the Domestic INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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Nuclear Detection Office) or overseas (like the Secure Freight Initiative). We assume a sequential game, where the defender first announces a policy of inspection and retaliation, and the attacker then chooses the best response to that policy. Unlike in Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) , we consider only a single attacker type (smuggling in only a single type of weapon), rather than multiple attacker types. However, we extend the model of Bier and Haphuriwat to allow for the smuggling of multiple nuclear bombs by the same attacker, essentially simultaneously. The simultaneous nature of the smuggling attempts in our model prevents the defender from mounting an effective response to a detected nuclear weapon (e.g., forensics, disabling of the attacker's network, etc.) soon enough to prevent other smuggling attempts. We define an attack to be any smuggling attempt, regardless of whether the attempt is successful.
The possible outcomes of this game are either attacker deterrence (no attack), an unsuccessful attack (in which all weapons are detected), or a successful attack (in which at least one weapon escapes detection and is assumed to cause damage). In this paper, we define the cost of an attack to the attacker as including both the cost of acquiring or developing the nuclear weapon(s) and any operational or logistical costs involved in the smuggling attempt. For example, these costs could include the efforts required to establish a network for trading and smuggling nuclear materials, or the effort required to plan and operate in such a manner as to evade intelligence efforts by the defender. Unlike in Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) , we also consider possible economies of scale in acquiring multiple weapons; the cost per weapon of acquiring or developing the nuclear weapons could be high for the first weapon, but decrease for additional weapons once basic capacities are obtained or nuclear-smuggling networks are established (Enders and Sandler 2005) In our model, we consider the possibility of retaliation by the defender against the attacker after either a successful or a foiled attack. Note that for the policy of (costly) retaliation to be effective at deterring attacks in a one-period game, the threat of retaliation must be credible (Haubrich 1995) ; i.e., if the defender announces a policy of retaliation, he must be willing to retaliate after a successful attack, even if doing so is more costly to the defender at that point in time than not retaliating. In general, retaliation may be more credible after a successful attack than after a failed attack; however, if retaliation after a failed attack is less damaging to the attacker, it may still be credible. We ignore the cost of false alarms that may cause unnecessary retaliation, because the chance of this happening when an actual nuclear device is detected is hopefully small.
These assumptions are captured in the following notation:
n: Number of containers that are inspected; N : Total number of containers; M: Number of nuclear bombs involved in a single smuggling attempt; V : Expected damage if at least one nuclear weapon is successfully smuggled into the United States; C d : Cost to the defender of inspecting a container; C a : Cost of acquiring and smuggling the first nuclear weapon; : Parameter reflecting economies of scale in acquiring multiple weapons; p: Conditional probability of successfully detecting a nuclear bomb, given inspection of a container that contains a bomb; S d : Cost to the defender of retaliating against the attacker after a successful attack; S a : Cost to the attacker of retaliation by the defender after a successful attack; F d : Cost to the defender of retaliating against the attacker after a foiled attack; Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. The probability that a terrorist attack succeeds depends on several of the above parameters. In particular, assuming that each nuclear weapon in a given smuggling attempt is detected or not independently of the other M − 1 weapons, the probability of a successful attack with M weapons will be given by 1 − np/N M (at least one weapon is not detected). The total attack cost depends on the number of nuclear weapons (M), the cost of acquiring the first weapon (C a ), and a factor reflecting economies of scale ( ) in acquiring nuclear weapons, according to M C a . If the factor is between zero and one, the average cost per weapon will be decreasing in the number of weapons, implying economies of scale, whereas = 1 implies that the cost is linear in the number of weapons.
The defender is assumed to minimize expected losses, including the inspection cost, the losses from successful attacks, and the cost of retaliation to the defender, as given by
The attacker, on the other hand, is assumed to choose whether to attack based on the defender's policy, according tô
Model Analysis
From Equation (2), we can see that the attacker will attack if his expected reward from a smuggling attempt is greater than zero, because the attacker can always ensure at least a zero payoff by choosinĝ A n D S D F = 0, or, in other words, by not attacking. Therefore, rearranging terms in the square brackets of Equation (2), we see that the attacker will attack if
The expression on the right-hand side of Equation (3) will be greater than N (implying that the attacker will always attack) even if the defender retaliates after both a successful and a foiled attack as long as
In this case, when the attack cost, C a , and the retaliation costs, S a and F a , are sufficiently small (and the expected damage to the defender is sufficiently large), the attacker cannot be deterred even by a combination of 100% inspection and retaliation. At the other extreme, the expression in the square brackets in Equation (2) will be less than 0 for n = 0 and
In this case, when the attack cost, C a , and the retaliation cost after a successful attack, S a , are sufficiently large (and the expected damage to the defender is sufficiently small), the defender can deter the attacker by a (credible) threat of retaliation alone (D S = 1), even with no container inspection (n = 0). Note that the threat of retaliation after a foiled attack does not affect this lower threshold because n = 0 implies that there are no failed attacks. In between these two cases is the case when
In this case, the attacker can in principle be deterred by a combination of inspection and retaliation. We will explain the defender's optimal inspection and retaliation strategies as a function of attack cost in more detail in the next subsection.
Optimal Strategies as a Function of
Attack Cost Figure 1 summarizes the defender's optimal strategies as a function of the attack cost, C a . Case 1 in this figure is where
In this case, the attacker will always attack; i.e., it is impossible to deter the attacker even by 100% inspection and retaliation combined. Therefore, the defender will not retaliate after either a successful or a foiled attack (because retaliation is costly to the defender), but will choose to inspect either 100% of all containers if
or no containers (otherwise). INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
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Case 2: Figure 1 is for a moderate attack cost,
In this case, the attacker can be deterred by a combination of inspection and retaliation. Therefore, the defender will either choose to inspect
or inspect no containers and not retaliate (otherwise). Note that if F a is small, the expression for the optimal inspection level, N /p M 1 − M C a + F a / V − S a + F a , is inversely related to the cost-benefit ratio of attacks to the attacker. In particular, if the cost-benefit ratio of attacks is small (i.e., the attacker pays a small total cost for attacking, but gets a large net reward), then a high inspection level would be needed to deter attacks and vice versa. Moreover, the defender can reduce the required inspection level to achieve deterrence by increasing the detection probability, p, and/or by increasing the costs of retaliation to the attacker (S a and F a ). (If the cost of retaliation, F a , after even a failed attack is sufficiently large, the optimal inspection level will approach zero; however, massive retaliation after a failed attack may not be credible.)
Finally, Case 3 in Figure 1 is where C a > V − S a /M . In this case, the attacker can be deterred by the threat of retaliation alone, so the defender will commit to a policy of retaliating against successful attacks, but will inspect no containers. Note that the costs of retaliation to the defender, S d and F d , do not appear in Equation (2), so they do not have any effect on the attacker's decision. Therefore, the defender's optimal inspection and retaliation policy does not depend on the cost of retaliation to the defender, but only on the cost of retaliation to the attacker. In particular, if the attacker always attacks (as in Case 1 in Figure 1) , the defender will automatically choose not to retaliate regardless of his retaliation cost, because any nonnegative retaliation cost will only increase the loss to the defender. On the other hand, if the attacker can be deterred (as in Cases 2 and 3 in Figure 1) , the defender will always commit to retaliating at least after a successful attack, because retaliation will decrease the required level of inspection to achieve deterrence, but successful deterrence means that the defender will never actually need to retaliate. (Note again though that if retaliation is too costly to the defender, the threat of retaliation may not be credible to the attacker in multiple-period games.)
Attack Cost and Success Probability
To understand how the assumption of allowing the attacker to smuggle in multiple nuclear weapons, rather than a single weapon (Bier and Haphuriwat 2009) , affects the results of our analysis, we examine the attack success probability and attack cost for different numbers of nuclear weapons. Figure 2 plots the success probability of an attack as a function of the product of the detection probability (p) and the inspection level (n/N ) for different numbers of nuclear weapons (M). This figure shows that the success probability of an attack increases rapidly with even modest increases in the number of weapons being smuggled. This is especially true when either the level of inspection or the detection probability INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
is small. For example, even if we inspect all incoming containers, if p = 0 6, the success probability of an attack would equal 0.4 with a single nuclear bomb; however, that probability would increase to approximately 0.8 with three nuclear bombs. Note also that the success probability of an attack depends on p and n/N only through their product. Unless the expression pn/N is extremely high, increasing the number of smuggled bombs, M, even just from one to two greatly increases the success probability of an attack, which quickly saturates (approaching 1) as the number of smuggled bombs grows still further. Figure 3 plots the cost of an attack as a function of the number of nuclear weapons M for different assumptions about the extent of economies of scale. As can be seen in that figure, when there are no economies of scale ( = 1), each weapon is equally precious, and the total attack cost is just linear in the number of weapons. Hence, the attacker does not have any benefit from smuggling in multiple weapons. This problem is of course even worse for the attacker in the case of diseconomies of scale ( > 1), in which case the cost per weapon is increasing in the number of weapons (e.g., because limits on the amount of nuclear material available may make it extremely difficult to acquire additional weapons).
On the other hand, smuggling in multiple weapons results in a lower cost per weapon when there are economies of scale ( < 1). (As described in §2, this case is of particular interest.) It corresponds to a scenario in which there exist fixed costs to establishing the networks and organizations necessary to trade and smuggle nuclear materials and technologies, but once established, these networks can easily provide access to a small number of weapons (in our analysis, no more than five). In our subsequent analysis, we choose the parameter representing the degree of economies of scale to be 0.3.
Estimating Parameters in the Model
To illustrate the practical implications of observations from this model, we estimated parameter values for the model described in §2 based on interpretation of open source literature about container shipping statistics, the consequences of attacks, the cost of nuclear detection systems to the defender, and the cost of a nuclear attack to the attacker. We do not estimate the costs of retaliation to the defender (S d and F d ) because, as discussed in §3.1, they do not affect the defender's optimal policy. 
Number of Containers Shipped to the United States

Consequences of a Nuclear Attack
ABT Associates (2003) estimates the cost of a nuclear attack on a major seaport or Washington D.C. to be approximately between $600 billion to $5.1 trillion. Note that these consequences of a nuclear attack also include indirect costs, which are estimated to be twice as much as the direct costs (property damages and trade disruption). These consequences consider negative outcomes such as public fear, declines in INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
U.S. geopolitical influence, and reduced global security and stability; however, the multiplier for the indirect costs is rather conservative because it considers only a single year period and only within the United States. Hence, for simplicity, we use monetary values of $500 billion as a lower bound on the consequences of a successful attack and $10 trillion as an upper bound on the expected damage from a successful attack (which extends beyond a single year period) as a convenient way of measuring all of these harms.
Cost of Nuclear Detection Systems
The GAO (GAO 2008) estimates the cost of radiationdetection equipment sufficient to support 100% container inspection for the period from 2007 to 2017 to be in the range of $2.6-$3.8 billion. We use the cost of ASP monitors, estimated by the GAO, as our inspection cost. Dividing the cost of 100% inspection by the number of years in the relevant time period and then by the number of containers per year yields an inspection cost in the range of approximately $20-$50 per container.
Cost of a Nuclear Attack
The estimated cost of developing a nuclear bomb has been estimated to be as high as $5 billion (Schwartz 1998 ) but as low as $2 million if the attacker obtained enriched uranium directly, rather than needing to develop an enrichment program (Zimmerman and Lewis 2006) . As noted previously, these costs are meant to represent all efforts required to acquire a functional nuclear weapon and are expressed in dollars; they are subject to considerations of economies of scale in the case where the attacker acquires multiple weapons.
Retaliation Costs to the Attacker
The retaliation costs to the attacker after either a successful or a foiled attack are extremely difficult to estimate. However, for purposes of this analysis, we identify three security postures that a defender could take regarding retaliation after a successful attack. The first would be a position that the retaliation after a successful nuclear attack should be disproportionately greater than the consequences of the attack to the defender. For this scenario, Equation (2) suggests that the attacker would never attack. However, it seems unlikely that a defender would be confident in relying solely on the threat of extreme retaliation to deter attacks, instead of implementing additional security measures. At the other extreme, the defender could adopt a policy of no retaliation. In this case, Equation (2) suggests that the attacker would always choose to attack, because the only consequence to the attacker of a failed attack would be loss of the weapon(s) and the cost of the smuggling attempt.
The final scenario is one in which the defender is able to create a perception on the part of the attacker that the suffering from retaliation would be of the same order of magnitude as the benefits from conducting an attack. This is the most interesting scenario because, following the model described in §2, it is in this scenario where partial inspection is most likely to play a role in influencing the attacker's decision.
Therefore, in subsequent analysis, we set the cost of retaliation, S a , close to the expected damage from a successful attack. Because a foiled nuclear attack may not be considered serious enough to justify massive military retaliation (beyond just disabling the attacker group), we examine two scenarios for retaliation after an unsuccessful attack: one in which the stated policy is to retaliate only after successful attacks (i.e., F a = 0); and one that calls for serious retaliation even following a foiled attack (e.g., F a = $50 billion).
As discussed previously for the consequences of a nuclear attack, the consequences of retaliation also could take many forms. However, for convenience, we estimate the costs from retaliation in monetary terms so that it can be subtracted from the benefits of an attack in deciding how an attacker is likely to respond to a particular security posture on the part of the defender. Table 1 summarizes the estimates for our model parameters. In this table, we also provide our best estimates or ranges of the parameters to derive stronger conclusions about the optimal inspection policy. We assume that the number of incoming containers is fixed at 12 million. We also fix the inspection cost at $30. Because the ranges and overall cost impacts of these parameters are relatively small, sensitivity analysis on these parameters does not lead to qualitatively different conclusions.
Summary of Credible Parameter Estimates
We also assume that the maximum number of nuclear bombs an attacker may try to smuggle into INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. the United States is five. By treating this number parametrically, we examine how the optimal defender strategy might change based on beliefs about whether the adversary has only a single weapon or has the capacity to conduct an attack involving multiple nuclear weapons.
As shown in Table 1 , we assume that the expected damage from a successful attack, V , is $3 trillion. As discussed previously, we set S a = $2 98 trillion (extremely close to $3 trillion) to create the best possible chance for partial inspection to be highly effective. In fact, however, our numerical results and qualitative conclusions do not depend on the specific parameter values selected here. Rather, to determine whether the defender can achieve deterrence, the results depend mainly on the relationship between the expected benefit to the attacker from a successful attack (net any costs of retaliation) and the total cost of implementing an attack (M C a ). Specifically, we assume for now that the cost of an attack is much lower than the benefits it affords to an attacker (although we revisit this assumption later), and assume that a defender can impose consequences through retaliation that are of the same order of magnitude as the benefits that the attacker receives through a nuclear attack.
Numerical Illustration
Using the model described in §2 and the parameter estimates described in §4, we now examine how various combinations of defender choices about inspection and retaliation could deter an attacker from striking. We know that if the cost of retaliation to the attacker is larger than the damage from a successful attack (i.e., V − S a < 0 , there is no need for inspection, because the threat of retaliation alone is enough to deter the attacker. However, if the cost of retaliation to the attacker is smaller than the damage from a successful attack, inspection (or partial inspection) may help to deter nuclear smuggling attempts. We first consider the case where F a = $0 and then move on to allow retaliation after a failed attack.
Deterring an Attacker with a Single Weapon
We first explore whether it is possible to deter an attacker with a single weapon if retaliation is limited to only successful attacks. We find that even with a high detection probability, it is difficult to deter the attacker in this case, so the defender is likely to need 100% inspection.
For scenarios in which the attacker acquires enriched material or a complete nuclear device (e.g., C a ≤ $1 billion), the defender needs 100% (or close to 100%) inspection at the best-estimate parameter values shown in Table 1 . Even when the cost of acquiring the first weapon and the detection probability are large enough that partial inspection is sufficient to deter an attacker, the required level of inspection is still generally quite close to 100%. See Figure 4 .
Deterring an Adversary with
Multiple Weapons As a second case, we consider how defender choices differ when the attacker can smuggle in more than one weapon. The results show that when there are INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
Additional information, including rights and permission policies, is available at http://journals.informs.org/. sufficiently large economies of scale, the attacker benefits by smuggling in multiple weapons. As a result, deterrence by partial inspection is more difficult to achieve, and the defender is likely to need 100% inspection at our best-estimate parameter values, as shown in Figure 5 .
Retaliation After a Foiled Attack
We finally consider the case where the cost of retaliation to the attacker after even unsuccessful attacks are nonnegligible (F a > 0). In this case, we find that the policy of retaliating after a foiled attack (if credible) decreases the required level of inspection (even if the cost of retaliation after a foiled attack is only a small fraction of the expected benefit from attacking). Moreover, retaliating against the attacker after even a foiled attack increases the feasibility of achieving deterrence using partial inspection, as shown in Figure 6 . Figure 6 shows the optimal inspection level as a function of the number of nuclear weapons and the detection probability when the cost of retaliation to the attacker after a foiled attack (F a ) is $50 billion. In this figure, even though the cost of retaliation after a foiled attack is only about 2% of the estimated benefit of attacking, the optimal level of container inspection decreases dramatically. From this figure, we can see that when the attacker smuggles in only a single nuclear bomb, less than 40% inspection is adequate to achieve deterrence for C a = $800 billion and F a = $50 billion, compared to 100% inspection for F a = $0 in 
Discussion
We have extended the model from Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) to consider the possibility that an attacker might smuggle multiple weapons into the United States, and the defender might retaliate after a foiled attack. We then used the resulting model to determine the level of container inspection at U.S. ports to deter the smuggling of nuclear weapons in container freight, and consider the defender's option of retaliating after a foiled attack.
However, because of the simplifications in the decision model and the assumptions about parameter values used in this analysis, it is appropriate to consider how our conclusions might be affected by the use of different assumptions.
What If the Parameter Values Used in
This Analysis Are Incorrect? The specific results presented in §5 were generated based on parameter estimates drawn from the existing literature. Given the difficulty in estimating concepts such as the consequences of a nuclear attack or the consequences of retaliation, it is fair to question the accuracy of the parameter values used in this analysis. However, as described in §4, the conclusions drawn in this paper do not rest on the specific parameter values INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
chosen. Rather, they depend on the assumption that the costs of an attack are much lower than the benefits an attacker receives from being successful, and that the defender can create a threat of retaliation that the attacker views to be of the same order of magnitude as the benefits from the attack. As long as the costs of an attack are low compared to the benefits of an attack, our analysis suggests that the consequences of retaliation should be the focus of debate among the national security community. Another way to model uncertainty is using Bayesian games (Mas-Colell et al. 1995 , Myerson 1997 , which assume probability distributions over uncertain parameters. However, extending the model to a Bayesian game would create additional parameters to estimate (i.e., parameters of the selected probability distributions). If it is felt that some of the parameters in our current model are so highly uncertain that they cannot be estimated effectively, then Bayesian games may be worth considering.
What If It Is Not Possible to Create a
Credible Threat of Retaliation? The results described above are based on the assumption that the cost of retaliation to the attacker after a successful attack is quite large (i.e., comparable to the consequences of a nuclear attack). When this cost is smaller, deterrence is difficult to achieve.
This issue is particularly salient if we consider alQaeda as an attacker. In particular, one may argue that the current U.S. policy toward a group like al-Qaeda is to dismantle the organization entirely. Because this policy has not yet been implemented successfully, it is appropriate to consider whether it is possible to present a credible threat of retaliation above and beyond the current counterterrorism posture. If the answer is that nothing else can be done, then retaliation holds little place in nuclear deterrence policy. If, on the other hand, it would be possible to increase the intensity of current counterterrorism efforts, expand the participation in those efforts by other collaborating nations, or target those policies against nations friendly to the terrorist group, then the observations made in §5 about the deterrent role of partial inspection may be valid.
Ultimately, answering these questions will require discussions among experts in the geopolitical diplomatic landscape, the military capabilities and options of the United States and its allies, and existing intelligence about threats of nuclear terrorism. Within this context, two additional considerations become relevant. First, establishing a credible threat of retaliation may depend on intelligence or forensics to identify the source of the nuclear weapon. If the source cannot be identified reliably, then targeted retaliation may not be possible; alternatively, if intelligence and/or forensics suggests that the weapons were stolen from (or supplied by) a nuclear-capable nation, then retaliation may be impractical (or even imprudent). Second, the goal of retaliation may be primarily to deter nuclear-capable nations from proliferating nuclear technologies. Such nations clearly have more to lose from retaliation and are mostly not yet the focus of concerted counterterrorism efforts. However, creating a credible threat of retaliation against such nations may be challenging, because the costs of retaliation against a technologically sophisticated nation are presumably significantly higher than the costs of retaliation against a nonstate adversary. Thus, a primary conclusion of this paper is that discussion of possible retaliation scenarios is of greater importance than analysis of the optimal percentage of containers to inspect.
What If Terrorists Could Attack in
Different Ways? The model used in this paper assumes that the only option terrorists have is to launch a nuclear attack using a container shipment. However, a terrorist group plotting a nuclear attack might well identify other approaches for smuggling nuclear weapons into the United States. Moreover, the goal of detection need not be deterrence in the strong sense of influencing an adversary not to attack; it may be adequate to convince the adversary to attack in a way that has less significance for the defender or that the defender can counter in other ways (Jackson et al. 2007, Morral and Jackson 2009 ). Several of these cases can be further analyzed using the model presented in this paper.
For example, one way of addressing this possibility is to change how the vertical axis in Figures 4 through 6 is interpreted. If this axis is taken to represent the percentage of inspection required for all modes of travel or conveyance (instead of just the percentage of container inspection), the conclusions INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
99 of our analysis would still hold. In fact, given the difficulty of implementing thorough inspection across all modes of transit into the United States (across both controlled and uncontrolled borders), our observations are arguably even more salient. In practice, of course, it will likely be infeasible to achieve the same detection probabilities for all modes of transit. Even in this case, we believe that our current model can still give some insight into this situation. In particular, if a terrorist has a significant opportunity cost for detection of a container smuggling attempt, that can be represented as a high implementation cost for launching a container-based attack. This would make it much more feasible to deter a container smuggling attempt with only partial inspection, but would also greatly reduce the benefits of container inspection to the defender, because the attacker would then be likely to try some other smuggling method (e.g., at overland borders or using small pleasure craft). If the defender has clear preferences regarding attack mode (e.g., if it is much easier to detect shipments via rail than via containers), then the model used in this paper could provide insights on the benefits of detection for deflecting attacks from one mode to another.
In addition, a terrorist group might also be willing to attack another country instead of the United States. Although security measures that make the United States less attractive than other countries could be seen as a deterrent, understanding the effectiveness of this deterrent would require understanding the relative effectiveness of each county's security posture and the relative attractiveness of attacks against each country to different terrorist groups. It is also important to recognize that U.S. interests could be significantly harmed by a nuclear attack on a U.S. ally or trade partner.
What If Terrorists Do Not Act Rationally?
Our game-theoretic model, particularly the terrorist decision making captured in Equation (2), relies on an assumption that terrorists plan rationally and account for the factors captured in this model. There are many other hypotheses that could be used, including that the goal for terrorists is simply to launch a nuclear attack at all costs (rather than maximizing expected reward), or alternatively that terrorists are extremely averse to failure. For example, a terrorist intent on attacking at all costs could be viewed as perceiving the benefits of an attack to be infinitely high, in which case it would clearly be impossible to create a retaliatory threat that is equivalent in magnitude.
By contrast, if a terrorist is extremely averse to failure, that may effectively increase the expected cost to the terrorist of launching an attack. These costs could include negative effects on other terrorist goals that result from the stigma of a failed attack, as well as the lost opportunity associated with possessing a weapon of significant strategic importance (if that weapon is used in an unsuccessful attack). If such costs are significantly great, then the potential for deterring nuclear terrorism would be correspondingly greater. Hao et al. (2009) model the possibility of irrational terrorist behavior by allowing for a nonzero probability that the attacker does not make optimal strategic decisions. If we were to adopt this type of assumption, we anticipate that policies based on deterrence would be even less reliably beneficial.
How Else Could This Model Be Extended?
Many of the critiques discussed above are tied to the simplicity of our model. Therefore, it is useful to consider other possible extensions of the proposed model. First, it would be desirable to extend our model to a multiple-period game. This extension would make it possible to determine the conditions under which retaliation is actually in the defender's longterm interest (and therefore credible). One could also model situations in which the attacker can threaten the defender by claiming to own nuclear weapon(s) and negotiate with the defender to achieve desired objectives.
Second, it would be desirable to consider other forms of deterrence. For example, a high percentage of inspection or a high cost of retaliation to the attacker could cause delay of an attack or other types of attacks (such as smuggling of dirty bombs or assault rifles, which would be less damaging to the defender), as in Bier and Haphuriwat (2009) . The model could also be extended to consider the case in which different ports that have different inspection percentages.
Another possible extension to our study is to relax the assumption that the expected loss to the defender from a successful attack is the same as the expected INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
reward to the attacker. Although this extension would obviously make the model more general, the question of how attackers value successful attacks has yet to be answered, making this model more difficult to quantify. Because our model considers only radiation portal monitors, another possible extension would be to determine optimal inspection levels for different types of detection technology (e.g., X-rays or gamma rays to image the contents of a container, or manual inspection). Determining how different technologies could be used most effectively is an area for further research.
In this study, we treated the number of weapons to be smuggled in by the attacker as exogenous; however, the model could be strengthened if we allow the attacker to choose the optimal number of weapons. Clearly, the attacker is likely to choose to smuggle in only a single weapon when there are no economies of scale (or diseconomies of scale) and multiple weapons when there are significant economies of scale. However, determining how the optimal number of weapons depends on the extent of economies of scale may be beneficial. Finally, the model could also be extended to apply to other types of inspection, such as airport security. For example, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration currently mandates 100% inspection of passenger carry-on items and all cargo carried on passenger planes; however, our model could be applied to determine the level of inspection that would be needed to deter passengers from bringing illegal materials onto their flights. Similarly, the model could be extended to determine the numbers of guards required at various checkpoints (e.g., at land borders). Each of these extensions would provide opportunities to advance understanding of the benefits of terrorism security efforts and expand the game-theoretic tools available to assess challenges of terrorism security policy. However, the preceding discussions suggest that the principal observations made in this paper hold some generalizable insights (extending beyond the simplicities of the model described in this paper), and as a result some relevance for policy discussions of how to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Conclusions
For realistic ranges of parameter values, we found that when the cost to the attacker of retaliation after a foiled attack is negligible, container inspection is not likely to deter a terrorist nuclear attack. Thus, the best a defender can do in this case may be to institute a policy of 100% inspection and hope for the best, even when detection systems can provide a high detection probability. Even in this case, however, our model recognizes that it may not always be optimal for the defender to implement 100% inspection, because the costs associated with acquiring detection equipment, operating that equipment, and modifying shipping processes may be too high, rendering inspection not cost effective (Martonosi et al. 2005 , Wein et al. 2006 .
On the other hand, if the defender can create a credible perception that the attacker faces a serious threat of retaliation after even a failed attack, then deterrence can be achieved by partial inspection. In this case, the defender may need to inspect only a modest percentage of all incoming containers, thereby reducing the overall costs of inspection.
In other words, if the attacker faces no threat of retaliation, the defender leverage rests entirely on the performance of detection technologies and processes-a position that leaves few options for defense. Thus, policy discussions about how best to prevent nuclear terrorism should focus on the feasibility and practicality of creating credible threats of retaliation (and on the attacker opportunity costs created by other possible uses of a weapon), rather than debating the optimal percentage of containers to inspect.
